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CLEHEN'l' V. STATE RECLAMATION BOABD

[35 C.2d

[Sac. No. 5962. In Bank. Aug. 2, 1950.]

ELDENW. CLEMENT, Appellant v. THE STATE
RECLAMATION BOARD et aI., Respondents.
[1] Waters-Flood Water&-Actions-Instructions.-Io an actioD
in inverse condemnation to recover for damage resulting from
construction and maintenance of a flood control project, the
instructions were based on an erroneous definition of terms
as applied to the facts, and precluded the jury from determining whether plaintiff's land was damaged by waters against
which he was entitled to the protection of a farmer levee.
[9] Id. - Flood Waters - Protection Against. - Although. flood
waters of a natural watercourse are a common enemy against
which an owner may protect his land subject to overflow by the
erection of defensive barriers, and he is not liable for damage
caused to lower and adjoining lands by the exclusion of the
flood waters from his property. he is liable for damage reo
sulting from his obstruction of the natural river channel or his
creation of a new artificial channel by which the natural stream
waters are carried onto another's lands that would otherwise
have been protected therefrom.
[3] Id.-Flood Waters-Protection Against.-Flood waters of the
Sacramento River are a common enemy against which proper
flood control measure may be taken without liability for damage
caused thereby.
[4] Eminent Domain-Compensation-Necessity for and Right to
OompensatioD.-Action that may be taken for his own protection without liability by an individual landowner may be taken
by the state for the protection of all the landowners in an area
without liability' under Const., art. I, § 14, for damage caused
thereby.
[6] Water&--,.Flood Waters-Protection AgainBt.-Io an inverse
condemnation proceeding to recover for damage resulting from ·
the construction of a flood control weir, plaintiff could assert
no right to recover for damage caused by water that would
have overflowed the natural banks of the river had the weir
not been constructed. Injury caused thereby is damnUM absqu"
injuria although it results in part from increased velocity of the
[2] See 26 Cal.Jur. 292; 56 Am.Jur.578.
[4) See 10 Cal.Jur. 283,325; 18 Am.Jur. 751.
KcK. Dig. References: [1,12) Waters, § 412; [2] Waters, 1404;
[3,8] Waters, § 402; [4,10J Eminent Domain, § 43(1); [5,7,11,16)
Waters, §407; [6] Eminent vomain, 145; [9,15) Waters, §414;
[13, 14] Appeal and Error, § 1250.
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water caused by the deepening of the channel in the construction
of the project.
[6] Eminent Doma!n-Oompenaation-What Oonstitutes Tald.Dg.If the construction of a flood control project diverts natural
stream waters onto the lan.d of a private owner and causes
damage thereto, that property is as much taken or damaged
for a public use for which compensation most be paid as if
it were condemned for the construction of a highway or a
school.
.
[7] Waters-Flood Waters-Protection AgainBt.-Farmer levees
in existence for 62 years upon which substantial sums bad been
expended in reJiaJ5ce of the continuance of the protection they
a1!orded, came to be the natural banks of a river, and tbe waters
they contained ·lefore a flood control project was completed
were natural stream water!! which could not be diverted onto
lands of another to his detrimp.nt without liability.
[8] Id.-Flood Waters-Protection AgainBt...-A landowner is not
deprived of the protection of the coron.on enemy doctrine by
his failure to maintain a faulty and insecure barrier in the
construction of protective levees.
Id. - Flood Waters - Actions - Appeal. - In an inverse condemnation proceeding to recover for damage resulting from
construction and maintenance of a flood control project, it was
within the province of the trier of fact. and not of the appellate court, to ~etermine whether the construction of a weir
increased the inundation of plaintiff's land or benefited it,
where there was evidence to support both inferences.
Eminent Domain-Compensation-Necessity for and Right to
Oompensation.-The construction of a public improvement is
a deliberate action of the state or its agency in furtherance of
public purposes, and if private property is damaged thereby
the state or its Rgp.ncy lIIust cl)mpensate the owner therefor,
whether the damage IVas intentional or the result of the
agency's negligence. The decisive consideration is whether the
owner if uncompenilated would contributl more than his proper
share to the puhlic undertaking.
Waters-Flood Waters-Protection Against.-In an inverse
condemnation proceedin;;- to recover for damage resulting from
" , the construction of II flood control project, plaintiff was
.' entitled to recover for damage attributable to defendants'
. 'lowering of a levee and diversion of the natural stream waters
into an artificial channel, but not for damage caused by flood
," waters against which he bad the duty of self-protection, even
though the velocity and carrying capacity of those waters were
increased by the construction of the project.
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[12] ld. -1'100d Waters - Actions - InstructioDB.-In an inverse
condemnation proceeding to recover for damage resulting from
the negligent maintenance of a flood control project, the instructions properly submitted the issue whethel defendants
were negligent in such maIntenance, and whether plaintiff was
damaged thereby.
[13] Appeal-QueatioDB of Law and Pact-Verdict on Substantial
Evidence.-The rule that a judgment will not be reversed if
there is substantial evidence .to !.IUpport the verdict on any
theory on which it might have beenreaehed, applies where one
or more of the possible theories on which the jury might have
reached a verdict is not supported by substantial evidence, but
other theories supported by such evidence were presented;
and also applies where no verdict other than that reached is
possible as a matter of law.
[14] Id.-QuestioDB of Law and Pact-Verdict on Substantial Ev1dence.-The rule that a judgment will not be reversed if there
ia sUbstantial evidence to support the verdict on any theory on
which it might have been reached, does not apply where the jury
has been precluded by erroneous instructions from considering
• valid theory upon which a result different from that reached
might have been supported.
[16] Watel'&-1'100d Waters-Actions-AppeaL-In an inverse
condemnation proceeding to recover for damage resulting from
construction and maintenance of a flood control project, the
eourt erred prejudicially in instructing a@ a matter of law on
the questions whether plaintiff's land was damaged. and
whether the statute of limitation had run on his cause, where
neither of the alternative grounds, upon which it was urged the
verdict was reached, ·~as established as Ii- mattei-onaw-;ana--where the evidence would have supported either of two verdicts.
[18] Id.-l'l00d Watera-.-Protection Aga1nst.-Participation by
the federal government in the construction of the Colusa Weir
as part of the Sacramento River Flood Control Project does
not relieve the state from liability for damages caused by the
project.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Colusa
County. C. C. McDonald, Judge.· Reversed.
Action in inverse condemnation to recover for damage
resulting from construction and maintenance of a flood control project. Judgment for defendants reversed.
(13) See 2 Oal.Jv. 919; 3 Am.Jv. 463.
• Au1pecl
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Earl D.Desni()~d, E. Vayne Miller and Hudson Ford for
Appellant.
Fred N. Howser, Attorney General,Walter S. Rountree,
Timothy W. O'Brien and Robert E. Reed, Deputy Attorneys
Geaeral, C. C. Carleton and Henry Holsinger for Respondents.
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TRA YNPR, J.-In an action in inverse condemnation
under article 1, section 14 of the California Constitution, t
plaintiif alleged that his farm land had been damaged by
defendants' construction and maintenance of a flood control
project on the east bank of the Sacramento River north of the
city of Colusa. The complaint was in two counts. The first
alleged a taking or damaging of private property for a public
use. The second alleged that the damage to the property resulted from the negligent maintenance of the project. Motions
for nonsuit were granted to the individual members of the
State Reclamation Board, and the cause was tried against the
State of California and the state agencies charged with the
maintenance and control of the project. The jury returned
a verdict for defendants, and plainti1f appeals from the
judgment entered thereon.
PlaintiiT's farm is located in the Butte Basin of the Sacramento Valley about a mile and a half northeast of Colusa,
and a quarter of a mile east of the east bank of the Sacramento
River~ It is rectangular in shape, 998.7 feet wide and about
a mile. in length, and its longitudinal axis extends east and
west. During the early St!tt1ement of Colusa County, riparian
owners cooperated in the construction of 600d control dikes
and levees along the east bank of the Sacramento River; By
1870 a series of levees 72 feet high along the east bank protected the lands in the Butte Basin, including that now OWDE'd
by plaintift:, from the waters of the Sacramento River at nornial flood stage. During the first few years of their maintenance two major breaks occurred in the levees. One, the
"DeJarnatt Break," was about three miles south of Colusa •
.the other, the "Moulton Break," was about 12 miles north
of Colusa. Thereafter, several minor break!! occnrred in the
levees, some of them directly opposite the lands of plaintiff.
At flood stage, the waters of the river passed through the
:'" t"PriYate property shall not be taken or damaged for publie ulle
,without just compensation haviDlllrstbeen made to, or paid into coun
·."f~~, the owner •••"
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several breaks in the levee and flowed into the Sutter and
Butte Basins generally without overflowing the levees. Plaintiff's land was subject to inundation whenever water collected
in the Butte Basin. He contends, however, that this inundation was caused by the over-all rise of water in the basin and
not by the direct flow of Hood water from the river and that
he was able to farm his property until 1940.
Shortly after the construction of the farmer levees, the
federal government took the first steps toward flood control
and reclamation in the Sacramento Valley. In 1898 the
California Debris Commission was created by an Act of
Congress to accomplish flood control and restore navigation in
the Sacramento River. In 1913 the Legislature formed the
State Reclamation Board and the Sacramento-Ban JoaqUin
.Drainage District, defendants herein, vesting them with broad
powers over all flood control matters relating to the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers and their tributaries. Further
'reclamation work was forbidden unless approved by these
agencies. Pursuant to a comprehensive plan of 1Iood control
formulated by these agencies in cooperation with the California Debris Commission and the United States Engineers,
the latter undertook construction of the project. The coat was
shared equally by the federal government and the state. The
state furnished the necessary rights of way, purchased flowage
'rights wherever necessary, and undertook the maintenance of
each part of the project as it was completed.
By 1982 the project was completed from the northern
boundary of Colusa County south to the eonftuenoe of the
Sacramento River and San Francisco Bay. In that year the
Moulton and DeJarnatt Breaks were closed b,. levees. The
channel of the Sacramentb River north of pIalntifl'. property
was deepened and widened and its carrying capacity' increased
from an undetermined bu~ substantially smaller capacity' to
145,000 cubic.feet of water per second. South of plaintiff'.
property, the narrower channel of the river had a mmmDm
carrying capacity' of 65,000 cubic feet of water per second.
Under these. circumstances no system of levees without relief
openings could be constructed within the limits of reaaonable
engineering. To provide a relief opening to C&1T7 off 80,000
cubic feet of water per second before the flow of the SacraDlento River reached its narrower channel to the IOUth, the
Colusa Weir was constructed by cutting the 62-year old farmer
In'ee to • height of 61.8 to 64 feet leavinc tile lnee DOriIl and

)
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south of the cut at 72 feet. The south end of the 1650-foot
wide cut lay about 500 feet northwest of the northwest corner
of plaintiff's farm. The cut was surfaced with concrete, and
parallel levees known as training levees were built at its
north and south ends, which extended eastward for about a
mile and gradually widened out so that at their termini they
were about half a mile apart. The north boundary of plaintUf's farm ran parallel to the ~uth training levee, being
separated therefrom by an 80-footwide strip of land through
which ran a ditch or borrow pit caused by the excavation of
dirt to build the training levee. The northeast corner of
plaintiff's land was directly opposite the east terminus of the
south training levee. The training levees were designed to
direct the water Bowing over the surfaced cut into the Butte
Basin to the east where it would fan out and thereby relieve
the Bow and pressure on the main river levees.
From the Colusa Weir to the end of the training levees, the
downward gradient is about 9 feet per mile, abruptly levelling
otf at the mouth of the weir, thus decreasing the high velocity
of the water Bowing over the cut, caused by the deepened
channel of the river to the north and the steep gradient
between the training levees. As a result of the decreased
velocity, the carrying capacity of the water was substantially
reduced, and as the water began to fan out at the mouth
of the weir it deposited silt and sand in the form of an
alluvial fan or delta that by the winter of 1939-1!>4O had
reached a sufIlcient height to impede and divert the Bow of
, water pouring over the cut and through the weir to the
east.. The Bow was no longer permitted to fan out into the
. basin but was diverted b, the delta at the mouth of the weir
. 80 that it flowed between the delta and the termini of the
training levees. The water that Bowed between the delta
and the end of the south training levee, instead of Bowing out
into the basin, backed up and overfiowed the east end of
plaintiff's farm. Plaintitf alleges that the water deposited
sediment and debris at the east end of his farm, forming a
delta thereon that made farming impos&1ole on that part of his
.property after 1940. It is also alleged that the high velocity
flow cut channels over the east part of the farm and filled
the borrow pit between the farm and the training levee, turning back toward the river and spilling over onto the central
portion of plaintiff's property, cutting new channels and
cIepositing sUt thereon. It is alleged that &I a result of this

)
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diversion of the water onto his land, plaintiff's farm depreciated in value from $30,000 to $8,000.
PlaintiE assigns as error certain instructions· given by the
trial court with respect to defendants' right under the
"common enemy doctrine" to construct flood control projects
without incurring liability to private landowners for damage
to their land caused thereby.
By the challenged instructions, the jury was instructed that
the natural banks of the Sacramento River were the walls
of the river cha.nnel cut by the action of the flowing water
without. reference to artificial dikes or levees constructed
thereon before 1870 by riparian owners; that the natural
stream waters were only those waters that were contained by
the natural banks of the river as defined by the court and
did not include waters that would have been contained by the
farmer levees; and that all waters that would have overflowed the natural banks of the river were flood waters. On
·"The phrase 'natural bank' as used by the Court in these instructions, mea liS. the elevation ot the surface of the ground which confines
the stream \vithin- ita natural channel, and which was formed by action
of the Bowing water, exclusive of artificial enbankments or le.ees."
"The Court instructs you that for the purposes of this case natural
stream waters comprise those waters which are. capable of being
retained within the natural banks of the Sacramento River and not
&asisted by artificial levees upon or near the banks."
"The Court further instructs you that for the purpose of thil case
waters in excesl of natural stream waters aB defined by the Court,
but retained within the leveed <"hannel by meaJUI of artificial leveea
or embankments conlltitute fiood waters."
"You are hereby instructed that there was no obligation on the
part of the defendants or auy of them to maintain levees on the Sacramento River for the protection of plaintift'."
"As to the levees along the Sacramento River in existence before the
conltruction of the Colusa Weir, you are inatructed that the plaintift'
had no right te hav'e the same maintained for his benefit, or maintained at all_ The causing of an opening to be made in such levees in
connection with the construction of the Colusll Weir was no invasion of
any right of the plaintiff if the effect thereof was merely to permit an
outlet for the flow of flood water from the Sa~ramento River."
"If you find that waters fiowing over the Colusa Weir were not
waters which would have been eonflned to the channel of the Sacramento River by the natural banks thereof exclusive of any artificial
levees, you are instructed that such waters were Bood waters. Flood
waters of the Sacramento River. as so defined, are a common enemy, as
to whi<"h the law recognizes the right of every landowner to protect
his lands by all reasonable means, even though damage mq thereby
be inflicted upon hill neigh bor."
"If in this case you find that the 8tate did nothing more than a
private landowner might have done on his own property without
liability, aa set forth in these instructionll, you are instructed to find

,.

~

Weadu.ta."

\

)

Aug. 19501 CLE¥E:-:T v. STATE: RECT.AMATlON
c

BOARD

635

135 C.2d 628: 220 P.211 897]

the basis of these definitions, the court instructed the jury
that if the water , flowing over the Colusa Weir was flood
water that would have overflowed the natural banks had the
farmer levees never been constructed, damage caused thereby
was not compensaQle; that defendants' liability under article
I, section 14 was limited to damage caused by the river waters
only if the cutting of the levee and ,the construction of the
Colusa Weir cut away the natural banks of the river and
allowed the natural stream waters to escape, and if the alleged
damage was caused by the diversion of the natural stream
waters. After the ,jury had retired, they requested a clarification of these instructions, which were then repeated and
summarized by the trial court as follows: .. If you don't understand that, in so many words it is this: If the defendants
in this case caused the natural stream water of the river to
fiow onto the lands of the plaintiff they would be liable; if
they didn't, they wouldn't."
[1] Plaintiff contends that the challenged instructions in
effect erroneously directed a verdict for defendants. He does
not attack the instruction explaining the common enemy
doctrine to the jury, but he objects to the definitions upon
which the instruction was based. In his view, the construction
of the farmer levees in 1870 and their continued maintenance
until 1932 created a new natural condition, in effect making
'. the channel between the farmer levees a new natural channel
. , 'and the waters contained by those levees the natural stream
:waters of the Sacramento River. He contends that the jury
should have been instructed that if the water causing the
, damage to his land was the natural stream water as he defines """-"- '- "- -""
,~t that damage is not covered by the common enemy doctrine
,
is compensable under article I, section 14. He asserts that
common enemy doctrine immunizes defendants from
only for damage resulting from the inundation of
by flood waters, i.e., waters that would not have been
l!9Ilta,ined by the farmer levee before it was lowered in the
of the Colusa Weir. We conclude that the trial
instructions were based on an erroneous definition of
m:f!'r.l'lWt as applied to the facts of the present case, and that
precluded the jury from determining whether plaintUI's
was damaged by waters against which he was entitled
the protection of the farmer levee.
[11 It is well established that the flood waters of a natural
Rt~lOU:rse are a common enemy against which the owner of

"
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land subject to overftow by those waters' may protect his
land by the erection of defensive barriers, .and that he is not
liable for damage caused to lower and adjoining lands by the
exclusion of the flood waters from his own property, even
though the damage to other lands is increased thereby. If he
obstructs the natural channel of the river, however, or creates
a new artiflcial channel by which the natural stream waters of
the river are carried onto the lands of another that would
have been protected therefrom but for the creation of the
artificial channel, he is liable for damage resulting therefrom.
(Weinberg Co. v. B~by, 185 Cal. 87, 95 [196 P. 25] ; Everett
v. Davis-, 18 Cal.2d 389, 393 [115 P.2d 821]; McDaniel v.
Cumming,,83 Cal. 515, 520 [23 P. 795, 8 L.R.A. 575]; Seuferl
v. Cook,74 Cal.App. 528, 537 [241 P. 418) ; Jon., v. Californta
Development Co., 173 Cal. 565, 575 [160 P. 823, L.R.A. 1917C
1021] ; LeBrun v. Richard8, 210 Cal. 308, 314 [291 P. 825,
72 A.L.R. 336]; McCarthy v.Standuh, 63Cal.App. 457,462
[218 P. 1025].)
[3] It is settled that the flood waters
the Sacramento
River are a common enemy against which proper flood control
measures may be taken without liability for damage caused
thereby.. (Gray v. Reclamation Dutrict No. 1500, 174 Cal. 622,
637 [163 P. 1024] ; Lamb v. Reclamation Did., 73 Cal. 125,
133 [14 P. 625, 2 Am.St.Rep. 775] ; Per-kinl v. Blauth, 163 Cal.
782, 790-792 [127 P. 50] ; SeUfert v. Cook, 74 Cal. 528, 537
[241 P. 418].)
[4l Action that may be taken for his own protection without liability by an individual landowner may be taken by the
state for the protection of all the landowners in an area 'with..out.liability-..under..article .l• .seetion ·14 for damage caused
thereby. (Archer Y. City ()f Los Angel.,; 19 Cal.2d 19, 24
[119 P~2d 11; O.'RMa v. LfJs Angeles County li'lood Control
Dist., 19 Cal.2d 61, 63 [119 P.2d 23] ; House v. LfJs Angeles
County Ylood O()fttrol Did., 25 Cal.2d 384, 388 [153 P.2d
950] ; Gray v. Reclamation »ut., 174 Cal. .622, 638 [163 P.
1024] ; San Gabml Valley Oountry Olubv. Oounty of LfJ,
Angeles, 182 Cal. 392, 406 [188 P. 554, 9 AL.R. 1200].) "The
liability of the state under article I, section 14 of the California
Constitution arises when the taking or damaging of private
property is not so essential to the general-welfare as to be
sanctioned UDder the 'police power' [citations]. and the
injnry is one that would give rise to a cause of action on the
part of the owner independently of the constitutional provision. [Citations.] The provision perinita an action against

of
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the state, which cannot be sued without its consent. It is
designed, not to create new ca~eS of action, but to give a
remedy for a cause of action that wO\Ild otherwise exist. The
state is therefore not liable under this provision for an injury
that is damnum absque injuria. If the property owner would
have no cause of action were a private person to inflict the
damage, he can have no claim for .compensation from the
state. [Citations.] In the present case, therefore, plaintiffs
have no right to compensation under article I, section 14, if the
injury is one that a private ·p arty would have the right to
indict without incurring liability." (Archer v. City of Los
Angeles, supra, p. 24; United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S.
' . 256, 266 [60 S.Ct. 225, 84 L.Ed. 230] ; Jacobsv . United States,
290 U.S. 13, 16 [54 S.Ct. 26, 78 L.Ed. 142]; Week v. Lo.
Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 80 Cal.App.2d 182, 193
[181 P .2d 935] ; Stone v. Los Angeles County Flood ControZ
Dist., 81Cal.App.2d 902, 912 [185 P.2d 396); Lamb v.
Reclamation Dist., 73 Cal. 125, 133 [14 P. 625, 2 Am.St.Rep.
775).) Since the common enemy doctrine protects defendants
from liability only to the extent that the waters carried onto
plaintift"s land were dood waters, the propriety of the challenged instructions depends upon the correctness of the
'.' definitions of dood water" and "natural stream water"
upon which those instructions were based. [5] Plaintiff can
.,'assert no right to recovery for damage caused by water that
have overflowed the natural banks of the river even if
Colusa Weir had not been constructed. Injury caused
me!relilY is damnum absque injuria even though it results in
. increased I velocity of the waters caused by the
~.deepe:nilllg of the channel in the construction of the project
er v. City 0/ Los Angeles, supra, 19 Cal.2d 19, 25, and
cited therein}, since plaintiff must protect his own land
, vagrant dood waters excluded from the lands of others
the construction of protective barriers, and he can assert
right to recovery of damages when the injury has resulted
his failure to take proper measures therefor. (Archer v.
of Los Angeles, 19 Cal.2d 19,25-26 [119 P.2d 1] ; Wei,...
Co. v. Bixby, 185 Cal. 87, 108 [196 P. 25].)
. [8] If, however, the construction of a dood control project
·, .... ' .......r.ll natural stream waters onto the land of a private owner
damage thereto, that property is as much taken or
!&maged for a public use for which compensation must be
~ if it were condemned for the construction of a highwa,.

j
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or a school. The propriety of the challenged instructions
therefore turns upon whether the trial court correctly. defined
the "natural banks" and "natural stream waters" of the
Sacramento River.
[7] It is true, as defendants assert, that the farm~r levees
are not the original banks of the Sacramento River. It is also
true that the "fact that a landowner avails himself of the right
to repel vagrant waters of a river by embankment dOes not,
.n the ab,ence of ,ome further circumstance, or ,eI of circumstances, impose upon him any obligation to maintain such
obstruction, or to refrain from restoring natural conditions." (Weinberg 00. v. Bixby, 185 Cal. 87,101 [196 P. 25].
Italics added.) It does not follow, however. that the state
may without liability tear out a protection that has existed
for 62 years to the lands of plaintift' upon .which substantialsums have been expended in reliance upon the continuance of the protection. (HOUle v. Lo, Angeles Oounty Flood
Oontrol Dist.,25 Cal.2d 384 [153 P.2d 950].) In view of the
long continued maintenance of thf' levees, together with the
expe'lditure of substantial sums hi farm investments in reliance thereon, the levees came to be the natural banks. The
waters they contained before thf' whole project was- completed
and the Moulton and DE'Jarnatt Breaks closed must be re~arded as natural stream waters that cannot be diverted onto
thE' lands of another to his detrimE'nt without liability therefor.
"Wherf' the creator of the artificial condition intended it to be
permanent, and 8 community of landowners or water users has
been allowed to adjust itself to the presence and existence of
the artificial watercouse or other artificial condition; acting
upon the supposition of its continuance, and this has proceeded
for a long time beyond thE' prescriptive period, the new condition will be regarded aE though it were a natural one, its
artificial origin being then disregarded by the law as it has
been by the community." (l Wiel. Water Rights in the
Western States (3d ed. [1911]. ~ 60. p. 59.) U A change in
the flow of a stream that appears to he permanent nsually
leads to costly adjustments by those interested, as they come to
regard the artificial condition as permanent. It is therefore
reasonable that they should receive as much protection as if
thE' condition were naturaL" (Natural .qoda Product, 00.
v. Oit'll of Lo.• Angeles, 23 Cal. 2d 193, 197 r143 P.2d 12]:
People v. Oit'll of Los A1Igel6.•. 34 CaJ.2d 695, 698 r214 P.2d 11 :
Chowchilla Parm" Tnc. v. Martin, 219 Cal. 1, 18 [25 P.2d
435] : HatM'Oft v. Ward, 24 Wash. 407, 411 [64 P. 520, 85

)
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Am.St.Rep. 955}; Kray v. MuggZi, 84 Minn. 90, 96 [86 N.W.
882, 87 Am.St.Rep. ·332, 54 L.R.A. 473]; Shepardson v.
Perkins, 58 N.H. 354, 356; Popham v. Holloron, 84 Mont. 442,
451 [275 P. 1099} ; Smith v. Youmans, 96 Wis. 103, 109-110
[70 N.W. 1115] ; Hammond v. Antwerp Light If P01Der Co.,
132 Misc. 786 [230 N.Y.S. 621, 635].) If the rule were otherwise, landowners in the area would have no recourse for
damage caused by the complete destruction of the farmer
levees.
The present 'case is distinguishable from Weinberg Co. v.
Bixby, 185 Cal. 87 [196 P. 25J, on which defendants rely. The
damage there considered was caused by flood waters and the
, defendants were held free from liability because they had done
. nothing more than to repel those waters from their own land,
action protected by the common enemy doctrine. In protecting their own land from inundation, they cut a dike that
had been constructed only ten years before. The dike had
atforded insubstantial protection during the years of its maintenance and had been periodically washed out by heavy rains.
;Its existence was more a hazard to the lands in the area than a
r:useful barrier. There was neither allegation nor proof that
~any expenditures or investments had been made in reliance
f!on this insecure barrier during the short period of its mainK.lJlCUJ.CC, nor was there any evidence from which it could be
that the damage complained of would not have
t~!cDrrt'!d had the dike not been cut.
Under those circum:.~ltan(!es, it was properly held tbat defendants were under no
to maintain tbedik,e "aiid -thafiliereoperung of the old
was not actionable. [8] It is clear that a landowner
". not deprived of the protection of the common enemy
by his failure to maintain a faulty and insecure
.Dllll"l''1P.l' in the construction of protective levees.
It does not
however, that .there is no duty not to destroy the
when it has proved substantially secure, has been
p laiJ1tainl!d for more than 60 years, and substantial sums have
expended in reliance upon its continued maintenance.
The construction of the Oolnsa Weir was not an inI.~i!pendlent project by which a continuous "flood control barrier
ent. The construction of the weir was coincident with
of the Moulton and DeJarnatt Breaks to provide a
opening for the protection of the levees. Damage
thereby is therefore not actionablt' I\nle~'! thl' clltting
weir caused more water to flow into the Butte Basin.
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than would have flowed through the Moulton and DeJ arnatt
Breaks before they were closed. There was ample evidence
to support defendants' contention that, even if it is assumed
that plaintiff's land was damaged by the inundation, the
damage· is not attributable to defendants' construction of the
Colusa Weir but tothe flood action of the Sacramento River
that would ha\'e caused the damage if the Moulton and DeJamatt BreakS had not been closed and the Colusa Weir had
not been constrUcted. Before the construction of the flood
control project, the Sacramento River during flood season
periodically overflowed the banks of its channel and poured
through the Moulton andDeJ amatt Breaks at an elevation
substantially lower than that of the. Colusa Weir. The result was that all the lands in the Butte Basin, including that
of plaintiJf, were only partially protected by the farmer
levees and were periodically inundated by the flood waters of
the river flowing through the breaks. The owners of the
lands· in the basin could have closed the breaks but, had they
done so, the river would inevitably have forced breaks at other
points along the levees, and, as the evidence showed, there was
a strong possibility· that such a break would have occurred at
a point opposite plaintiff's property because of the occurrence
of previous breaks in that location. The rear part of plaintiff's
property was classified as swamp and overflowed land in the
original government survey of ·llie area. It is not disputed
that it would have been.pool' engineering practice to close the
Moulton and DeJarnatt Breaks and not to provide another
relief opening such as the Colusa Weir. There was evidence
that, rather than diverting water onto plaintiJf's land by which
it would otherwise not have been reached, the construction· of
the Colusa Weir and the closing of the other breaks actually
diminished the flow of water into the Butte Basin, limited the
occasions upon which it was flooded, and raised the level at
which the river woUld overflow. There was evidence that the
construction of the 'Colusa Weir did not increase the frequency
of inundation of plaintiJf's land and that plaintiff's land was
not flooded to any greater. extent than it had been by water
ftowing through the Moulton and DeJarnatt Breaks before
the weir was constructed. The jury could have inferred that
the large expenditures of the state and of the federal govern~
ment for greater flood protection than that afforded by the
tarmer levees actually benefited plaintiJf as well 8B the other
landowners, and that the damage caused by waten lowing
oyer the' Colusa Weir wuless than would have beea eausecl by
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the flood waters of the river had the project not been constructed. This evidence, however, does not as a matter of law
require a verdict for defendants. They did in fact cut the
bank of the river from eight to ten feet below its normal
elevation opposite plaintiff's land and caused the flow of
water over the weir to be dumped on plaintiff's land. The
water that would have flowed through the Moulton and DeJ arnatt Breaks before they were closed is flood water because
it was not contained by the banks of the river. The water
that was prevented from going through these breaks after
they were closed remained flood water, and if it is that water
, that went over the Colusa Weir defendants are not liable.
Thus defendants are liable only if the water flowing over the
Colusa Weir is water that would have been contained by the
banks of the river had the Moulton and DeJarnatt
Breaks not been closed. Plaintiff's witnesses disputed the
evidence of the state and asserted that water was thereby
dumped on plainti«'s land to a substantially greater extent
than would have been the case had it been carried out the
old breaks. The jury could have inferred from this evidence
~t plaintiff's land was damaged by the diversion of water
, over the Colusa Weir whereas it would not have been so
damaged by the retention of the Moulton and DeJarnatt
Breaks. We cannot say that such an inference finds no
,' iupport in the evidence. The resolution of the conflict must be
made by the trier of fact and not by this court on appeal.
Baker v. Southern Calif. Ry Co., 106 Cal. 257, 285 [39 P.
46 Am.St.Rep. 237] ; Perkim v. Blaufh, 163 Cal. 782, 790[127 P . 50].)
I
'Since there is no question of the power of the state to
,
the Colusa Weir, cases such as Gray v. Reclamation
174 Cal. 622, 653 [163 P. 1024], in which an injunction
the construction of a flood control system was sought,
, not in point. [10] The construction of the public im'1)1'0VI!m4ent is a deliberate action of the state or its agency in
Yn.,'1'n'..... 'nt>.. of public purposes. If private property is damthereby the state or its agency must compensate the
therefor (Cal. Const., art. I, § 14; Perkins v. Bla11tll.,
Cal. 782, 789 [127 P. 50] ; Kaufman v. Tomich, 208 Cal. 19,
P . 130]), whether the damage was intentional or the
of negligence on the part of the governmental ageney~
CR.!nfo,oinft V. San Francisco, 660al. 492, 505 [6 P. 317, 56 Am.
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Rep. 109] ; MitcheU v. Oity!)f Santa Barbara, 48 Cal.App.2d
568, 572 [120 P.2d 131] ; Hooker v. Farmers' Irr. Dist., 272 F.
600; see cases collected in 69 A.L.R. 1231.) The decisive consideration is whether the owner of the damaged property if
uncompensated would contribute more than his proper share to
the public undertaking. (Rose v. State of California, 19 Ca1.2d
713,737 [123 P.2d 505] ; City of Stockton v. Vote, 76 Cal.App.
369, 404 [244 P. 609] ; City of Redding v. DiesteZhorsi, 15
Cal.App.2d 184, 193 [59 P.2d 177]; Oity of Pasadena v.
Union Trust 00.,138 Cal.App. 21, 25 [31 P.2d 463] ; Temescal
Water 00. v. Martlin, 121 Cal.App. 512, 521 [9 P.2d 335].)
The applicability of the common enemy doctrine as a
defense available to defendants on a retrial of this cause is
set forth in Archer v. Oity of Los Angeles, 19 Cal.2d19 [119
P.2d 1]. In that case, defendant city had constructed certain
improvements to facilitate the drainage of a watershed area
near Venice. Flood waters caused by an unusually heavy rain.
fall wertl drained off the lands of upper owners in the area
and carried by the drainage system into a lagoon below that
was inadequate to contain the greatly increased 1Iow. --As a
result, the 11000 waters spilled over onto the lands of the
plaintiffs, inundating them for several days. It was not
contended that the water causing the damage was natural
stream water or that it had been diverted by the drainage
system out of its natural channel. The court recognized that
c'lf the water is diverted out of its natural channel and discharged into a di1ferent channel or upon neighboring land,
the diverter is liable to the owner whose land is injured by
such discharge. [Citations.] In the present case, however,
there is no evidence of diversion. Straightening, widening,
or deepening the channel of a -stream to improve the drainage
entails no diversion of tJ:I.e waters therein." (Archer v.
Oity of Los Angeus, supra, p. 26.) Since, in that case, the
damage was caused solely by 11000 waters that would have
inundated plaintiffs' land even though the drainage System
had not been constructed, it .was held that the injury was
damnum absque injuria, and that it was not made actionable
merely because the construction of the drainage system had
increased the 'velocity of the 1Iood waters or the extent to which
they covered plaintiffs' land. [11] By the same reasoning,
plaintiff in the present case is entitled to recover for whatever
damage to his land is attributable to defendants' lowering of
the levee and diversion of the natural stream waters into an
artificial channel. but cannot recover for any damage caused
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by flood waters against which he had the duty of selfprotection, even though ~e velocity of those waters and their
carrying capacity were increased by the construction of the
flood control project.
[12] There is no merit in plaintiff's contention that the
trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the allegations
of the second count of his complaint, by which recovery was
sought on the basis of defendants' allegedly negligent maintenance of the Colusa Weir. The transcript discloses that
adequate instructions on negligence were given the jury;
and that plaintiff requested no instructions tllereon that were
not given. The effect of the instructions was to submit
properly to the jury the issue whether defendants were negligent in the maintenance of the Colusa Weir and whether plaintiff was damaged thereby. (See Rouse v. Los Angeles County
Flood Control Dist., 25 Cal.2d 384 [153 P.2d 950].)
Defendants contend, however,'that any error in the instruc.tions was not prejudicial for the reason that the jury might
· have based its verdict on the absence of damage to plaintiff's
land or the applicability of the statute of limitations, issues not
• attected by the challenged instructions. [13] They rely on
the rule that a judgment will not be reversed on appeal if
.there is substantial evidence to support the verdict on any
· theory on which it might have been reached. That rule applies
cases in which one or more of the possible theories on '
, 'which a jury might have reached a verdict is not supported by
· Itlbstantial evidence, but other theories supported by such
m.<1elllce were presented i- iti8;tlien -presumed 'thatthe . jury
its verdict on a theory that is supported by the
The rule also applies to cases in which no other veris possible as a matter of law. [14] It is not applicable,
\Jt1'l'WfI!"fI!l', to a case such as this, in which the, jury has been
~~ec11Ilaeia by erroneous instructions from considering a valid
- ........... upon which a result different from that actually
might have been supported. The enor in such a case
cancelled by the fact that the jury might have found for
-prevailing party on some other ground. "'It is true that
determining whether a verdict is supported by the evidence,
must assume that the jury accepted the view most favorable
respondent. However, in determining whether or not
iiUItrlilctioI1S given are correct, we must assume that the
have believed the evidence upon which the [cause
or defense of] the losing party was predicated, and
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that if the correct instruction had been given UPOIl that subjt'ct
the jury might have rendered a verdict in favor of the losing
party.''' (Oettinger v. Stewart, 24 Cal.2d 133, 140 [148 P.2d
19, 156 A.L.R. 1221] ; 0 'Meara v. 8wortfiguer, 191 Cal. 12, 15
[214 P. 975].) [15] Where, as here, the error consisted in
instructing the jury as a matter of law on a question that is one
of fact on conflicting evidence, and a determination favorable
to the losing party might have been made if the error had not
been committed, that error is prejudicial. (Edwards v.
Freeman, 34 Ca1.2d 589, 594 [212 P.2d 883]; Huebotler v.
FoUe", 27 Cal.2d 765, 770-771 [167 P.2d 193].)
Neither of the alternative grounds upon which it is urged
that the jury could have reached its verdict is established
by the evidence as a matter of law. On both grounds,
there was conflicting evidence by which either of two verdicts
could be supported.
There was ample evidence to support defendants' contention that plaintiff's land was not damaged by the water. Defendants' expert witnesses tt'stified that the deposit of soil on
plaintiff's land was of a fine fertile quality, superior to that
of the natural soil beneath it, but that plaintiff made no
attempt to clear and cultivate the land after 1941, even
though he might easily have done so. There was evidence
that the swales allegedly cut on plaintiff's land were in fact
cut by flood waters pouring through the breaks in the farmer
levees before the construction of the Colusa Weir. There was
testimony that the value of plaintiff's land had not been
decreased by its inundation but that it bad in fact been increased by the soil deposited thereon. We cannot. say, however, that plaintiff's evidence would be insufficient to support
a verdict in his favor. He testified that his land had depreciated $22,000 in value because of the inundation, and
that it-could not be farmed along the easterly third because of
the sedimentary deposit. His testimony was corroborated by
expert witnesses. Plaintiff was competent to testify to the
value of his own property (Willard v. Valley Gas ct Fuel Co.,
]71 Cal. 9, 14-16 [151 P. 2861>. and his testimony, if believE'd,
wonld snpport an implied finding that he suffE'red damage to
his land by the construction of the Colusa Weir.
The defense that the statute of limitations had run on
plaintUf's canse of action is not established by evidence that is
without conflict. Plaintiff testified that the damage to bis
land first became apparent on or about June I, 1941. He
filed a claim therefor with the State Board of Control on Mar
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7, 1942. That claim was not rejected by the board until September 22, 1944, and the complaint in this action was filed on
October 16, 1944. It is clear, therefore, that if plaintiff's testimony were believed by the jury, neither the two-year limitation period prescribed by Political Code, section 688.1, nor
the three-year limitation period prescribed by Code of Civil
Procedure, section 338(2), had run at the time this litigation began. (Natural Soda Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles,23 Ca1.2d 193, 202 [143 P.2d 12].)
.
, [16] Defendants also contend that the participation in the
project by the federal government relieves them from liability
for damage caused thereby. They rely on Cory v. City of
Stockton, 90 Cal.App. 634 l266 P. 552], and Brandenburg v.
.-Los Angeles County Flood C01&trol Disl., 45 Cal.App.2d 306
. [114 P.2d 14]. In the Cory case, defendant's only partici, pation in the project was the purchase of land for a right of
.ay. In the present case, the state paid half tIll! construction costs, purchased lands for rights of way and flowage,
participated with the federal agencies in the planning of
the project. Responsibility for its control is vested con' ~urrently in state and federal governments. (U. S. River and
H arbor Act of August 26, 1937; Water Code, § 8530.) The
a;,Clpe:ratlon of the completed project is the sole responsibility of
- state. (Water Code, § 8361 (i); 11 Ops. Atty. Gen. 93-94.)
. Brandenburg case decided that plaintiff's minor son, for
death recovery was sought, was not .. property" of
....Ilicm· there was a taking within the meaning of article I,
14, and that the state had therefore not consented to
sued for the negligence of its agents therein. The
that the state was relieved from liability bi"the particiof the federal government in the project was un~esl8ar'Y to the decision therein and is inconsistent with later
involving the same defendant in which its liability has
·recognized. (House v. LOl Angeles County Plood Con25 Ca1.2d 384, 392 [153 P.2d 950] ; St01&e v. LOl
County Plood Control DiBt., 81 Cal.App.2d 902 [185
396] ; Week v. Los Angeles County Flood C01&trol Did.,
Cal.App.2d 182 [181 P.2d 935].)
' . '. judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for
" .,in accord&:lce with the views expressed herein.

J
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CARTER, J.-J concur in the judgment of reversal, but do
not agree with the reasons on which it is based. The majority
opinion cites and apparently relies upon, the cases of Archer
v. City 01 Los Angeles, 19 Ca1.2d 19 L119 P.2d ll,and O'Hara
v. Los Angeles Flood Control Did., 19 Cal.2d 61 [119 P.2d 23].
These cases are in direct conflict with the basic,theory upon
which the majority opinion in this case is based:- I dissented
in both of the last mentioned cases and the views expressed
in those dissents constitute the only basis upon which plaintiff
may prevail in the case at bar. What the defendants did in
the Archer and 0 'Hara cases is the same as what the defendants did in the case at bar, namely, they constructed a flood
control system which was inadequate to protect plaintiff's
property from damage by :flood waters which would not have
caused such damage had the system not been constructed. In
those cases, the majority of this court held that defendants
were not liable for the damage th~ caused to plaintiff's
property. In the case at bar the majority opinion holds that
if plaintiff's property was damaged as the result of the
changes made by defendants in the :flood control system in
the vicinity of plaintiff's property, he may recover. It should
be clear to anyone that the basic legal theory of the Archer
and 0 'Hara cases is diametrically opposed to the theory upon
which the majority opinion in the case at bar is based. Yet the
former cases are relied upon as authority for the conclusion
reached in the case at bar. I commend the majority, and particularly the author of the present opinion, for their and his
change of view, but I feel constrained to suggest that much
confusion would be avoided in the law in this field if the
..Aichermd--O'Hara; cases' were overruled and a forthright
declaration made by this court to the effect that defendant's
liability in cases such as this is predicated upon section 14
of article I of the Constitution of California and that the
police power doctrine cannot be invoked to deny compensation
or damages to owners of property which has been destroyed or
damaged as the result of the construction or operation of :flood
control projects. The Archer and 0 'Hara cases deny recovery
upon the theory that the damages suffered were dam·num
absque injuria in that they resulted from the construction and
operation of a :flood control project by a public agency in the
exercise of the police power. The present case holds that
plaintiff may recover under section 14 of article I of the
Constitution of California for any damages suffered as the
result of the natural :flow of the waters of the Sacramento
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River discharging onto his property by reason of the changed
conditions in the levees along the river brought about by the
flood control project constructed by defendants. The two
theories are inconsistent and no amount of distinguishing can
.
reconcile them.
I agree with the holding in the majority opinion that
II • • •. the construction of the farmer levees in 1870 and their
continued maintenance until 1932 created a new nIP.tura!
; condition, in effect making the channel between the farmer
levees a new natural channel and the waters contained by
those levees the natural stream waters of the Sacramento
River." But, I do not agree that under the so-called common
enemy doctrine defendants are not liable for damage to
plaintiff's land from flood waters which were caused to flow
with destructive force upon plaintiff's land as the result of the
lowering of the levee in the construction of the Colusa Weir,
which admittedly lowered the east bank of the river to a
depth of between 8 and 10 feet opposite plaintiff's land,
without providing adequate safeguards against flood waters
discharging through this weir with destructive force upon
plaintiff's land. While this court has held in many cases tbat
an owner of property has the right to protect his property
against so-called flood waters by the construction of levt'es,
dams, etc., on his property and that other property owners have
DO right of action for damages against him because such levees
or dams cause the flood waters to discharge onto their property
destructive force, this does not mean, and no case except
Archer and 0 'Hara cases has ever held, that an owner of
nrtmeriv may not complain, and recover damages for injury to
n1"lln"riv as a result of the construction of a flood control
,"prOJect where protective barriers are deliberately removed and
waters are deliberately collected and discharged onto his
.....'I'I\T' ...-i~... with such destructive force as to damage or destroy
The very fact that a project· is undertaken by a
....."... .".. agency for the purpose of controlling flood waters
afford a sound basis for the contention that such a
when completed should protect property adjacent
from damage by flood waters regardless of their
i!4)}ume or velocity. To say that the comomn enemy doctrine
.....vu•.u apply to a public agency charged with the duty and
of constructing and maintaining a flood conproject the same as to a private individual owning land
~ ...""'£u to a stream, is to my mind, unsound, if not absurd.
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Yet, the majority opinion states: "Action that may be tak~n
for his own protection without liability by an individual landowner may be taken by the state for the protection of all the .
landowners in an area without liability under article I, section 14 for damage caused thereby." The opinion then cites
and quotes from the Archer case as authority for this state- ,
ment. As heretofore· stated, a complete answer to this statement is found in my dissenting opinion in the Archer case.
It is apparent that the majority opinion limits the right of
a private owner of land to recover damages in a case such as
this, to such damages as may be caused from a diversion of
natural stream waters onto his land. In this respect the major- ity opinion states: "If, however, the construction of a flood
control project diverts natural stream waters onto the land of
a private owner and causes damage thereto, that property is as
much taken or damaged for a public use for which compensation must be paid as if it were condemned for the construction
of a highway or a school." The majority opinion does not
define. what constitutes" natural stream waters." Such waters
have, however, been defined by this court in Herminghaus v.
Southern California Edison Co., 200 Cal. 81 at pages 90 and
91 [252 P. 607], as being the usual and ordinary flow of the
stream through the various seasons of the year, and "that
annualZy recurring floods, even though the flow of their water.
made the stream wider during the period thereof 80 (J8 to
include adjoining lands, are yet to be deemed a pari of the
ordinary flow of the stream." While the discussion in the
Herminghaus case rela~d to the right of a riparian owner to
have the full natural flow of a stream to flow past his land, it
correctly defines what constitutes the usual and ordinary flow
of Ii stream in its relation to the common enemy or extraordinary flood waters doctrine. In other words, what constitutes
the usual and ordinary flow of the Sacramento River are the
waters which customarily flow in said river throughout the
various seasons of the year, the fall, winter, and spring :flows
being greatly in excess of the summertime flow. It is a matter
of common knowledge, and one of which we can take judicial
notice, that at various times in the past, flows which greatly
exceeded the usual and ordinary flow during the f$ll, winter,
and spring seasons have occurred, some of them amounting to
what may be termed floods which caused great damage to lands,
improvements, and livestock adjacent to the lower reaches of
the Sacramento River. It was to prevent the damage caused
b7 these recurring :floods that the various flood control projectaJ
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were undertaken and prosecuted to completion. If the project
here involved was so constructed that the property of plaintiff
and other property owners would suffer greater damage from
these recurring floods than they would have suffered before
the project was constructed, such landowners should be entitled
to the damages suffered, and the so-called common enemy doctrine should not be invoked by the Reclamation Board or other
public agency responsible for the inadequacy of the project to
accomplish the objective of the :flood control project.
I am unable to follow the reasoning in the following excerpts
from the majority opinion: "The construction of the Colusa
Weir was not an independent project by which a continuous
flood control barrier was cut. The construction of the weir was
coincident with the closing of the Moulton and DeJarnatt
Breaks to provide a relief opening for the protection of the
levees. Damage caused thereby is therefore not actionable
unless the cutting of the weir caused more water to :flow into
the Butte Basin than would have :flowed through the Moulton
and DeJ arnatt Breaks before they were closed." . . .
"The water that would have flowed through the Moulton
and De J arnatt Breaks before they were closed is flood water
because it was not contained by the banks of the river. The
water that was prevented from going through these breaks
after they were closed remained :flood water, and if it is that
water that went over the Colusa Weir defendants are not
. liable. Thus defendants are liable only if the water :flowing
the Colusa Weir is water that would have been contained
the banks of the river had the Moulton and OeJarnatt
Br'eala. not been closed. " - - ...... -_... ' ........
.As I interpret the foregomg excerpts from the majority
"Cl~pilliOlt1, the thought intended to be expressed is that although
I,.laintiff had suffered no damage from flood waters which were
~11RI',hll.'''D'f'!Cl through the Moulton and DeJarnatt Breaks, and
l'nI'ou1:d not have suffered any damage from the flood here in
~ltielrticm had said breaks been left open, and that the damage
property was caused by the closing of the breaks and
construction of the Colusa Weir, yet he may not now
ftii!co'ver for any damage to his land if the waters causing said
were flood waters which would have discharged
:brt~n,,'h the Moulton and DeJarnatt Breaks, but which were
through the Colusa Weir because said breaks were
To my mind this is a strang~ and unsound rule of
In effect, it places in the hands of a public agency charged
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with the duty and responsibility of constructing and maintaining flood control projects, the power to so construct and operate
such projects as to damage or destroy such private property
as such agency may see fit, without being liable to the owner
of such private property for the loss suffered by him. If there
is any basis in reason, logic, common sense, or law for such a
holding it has not been advanced in a majority opinion, and
I have never read a decision of any court announcing such a
rule, except the Archer and 0 'Hara cases.
The majority opinion attempts to distinguish this case from
the Archer case by the following statement: "Since, in that
case (Archer), the damage was caused solely by:flood waters
that would have inundated plaintiffs' land even though the
drainage system had not been constructed, it was held that
the injury was damnum absque injuria, and that it was not
made actionable merely because the construction of the drainage syStem had increased the velocity of the llood waters or
the extent to which they covered plainti.tis' l8nd.By the
same reasoning, plaintiff in the present case is entitled to
recover for whatever damage to his land is attributable to
')
defendants' lowerin~ of the levee and diversion of the natural
stream waters into an artificial channel, but cannot recover
for any damage caused by flood waters against which he had
the duty of self-protection, even though the velocity of those
waters and their carrying capacity was increased by the construction of the flood control project." The purported distinction between this case and the Archer case attempted in the
foregoing excerpt is not borne out by the record in the Archer
ease. ~ is shown by tbe following excerpt from my dissent- .----..-.-------.- ---------..- mgopwo:n in that case: (Archer v. City of Lo, Angel", 19
Cal.2d 35 [119 P.2d 1]) "It is manifest that the foregoing
facts are sufficient to make a prima facie case in accordance
with plaintiffs' allegations and to establish what the District
Court of Appeal declared to be the gist of the Archer action,
that is, that «The gist of [the] . . '. complaint • . . is that
respondent constructed and built an artificial drainage system
80 defectively, carelessly and negligently that it would not
carry the storm waters to the Pacific Ocean as designed and
intended' and 'tbat the injury occurred by reason of the fact
that respondent negligently turned the storm waters into La
Ballona .Lagoon, which was too small to conduct the water
turned into it by and through the drainage system constructed,
operated and maintained by respondent . . .' (Archer v. Cil1/
_/ Loa Angele" IUprG) On the doctrine of tbe law of the
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ease, as to the Archer ease, and stare decisis, as to the Allison
case, it must be held that plaintiffs have established the liability of defendants.
•• The attempted answer to that incontrovertible proposition
advanced by the majority opinion is that: 'According to the
alkgations of the complaint, the damage resulted because
defendants negligently diverted water out of its natural channel, and obstructed the channel of the creek. Plaintiffs evidence, however, fails to substantiate such allegations.' That ·
statement is palpably incorrect. The gist of the action as
stated by the District Court of Appeal was not that water had
been 'diverted out of its natural channel,' rather it was that
the defendants negligently 'turned the storm waters into La
Ballona Lagoon,' that is, collected surface waters and discharged them into the lagoon. The evidence without contradiction shows that that occurred. The storm waters were collected into drains and turned into the lagoon and creek, the
l outlet of which was too small to carry them, with the result
~. that plaintiffs' lands were flooded when the lagoon overflowed.
The prior decision is therefore the law of the case and controlling here. " Also, the following excerpt from that opinion
which appears on page 60: •• Summing up, we have cases
t.·. where public agencies. with no proprietary right so to do, have
f collected surface waters by the installation of drains, have disf
( charged those waters into a natural watercourse, and have
failed to provide adequate means of escape for those waters
,into the ocean, well knowing that their conduct would cause
:.the flooding of plaiutiffs' Rremises, As a result of that con:: duct, the waters discharged in the watercourse exceeded its
,'·capacity and could not escape through the inadequate outlet,
' and plaintiffs' land and the improvements thereon, not riparian
,~to the stream, being three miles away, and not having thereJ ofore been subject to overflow by any of the waters, are flooded
'and damaged. The majority decision is contrary to the firmly
established law in California and the weight of authority in
I>ther jurisdictions. It will not only result in a grievous mi&~arriage of justice in the cases now under · consideration, but
ril cause great confusion in the law on the subject here
'-.. volved. "
~~ In the last quoted excerpt from the majority opinion ba
"ecase at bar, the statement is made that plaintiff" . . . canOt recover for any damage caused hy flood waters against
~ich he had the duty of self-protection, even though the veloc-
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ity of those waters and their carrying capacity was increased
by the construction of the flood control project." It is difficult
forme to understand how anyone could have the temerity to
even suggest that a person situated as plaintiff in this cast'
could protect himself against flood waters of the destructive
volume which was debouched on his land as the result of the
operation of the flood control project here involved. Such suggestion transcends the height of absurdity and cannot be said
to have for its foudation a shred of reason, logic, or common

sense.
While it is probable that the advent of the great Central
Valley project, which envisions the construction of numerous
dams to impound the flood waters of the great Sacramento and
San Joaquin Rivers at or near their sources so as to prevent thE'
recurrence of the great floods which have in the past atvariouR
times inundated the valleys through which these rivers flow
with .consequent damage and destruction of property, may
relieve posterity from the arduous burden of attempting to
bring lucidity and order out of the confusion and chaos which
now exists in the decisions of this court involving the control and use of water, I have grave doubt that any student of
water law, should he so desire. will be able to reconcile thl'
decisions of this court with any pattern which may be said to
refiect judicial erudition or craftsmanship in the development
of this body of our law.
SCHAUER, J.-I concur in the judgment and in the discussion by Mr. Justice Traynor except insofar as such discus.
sion appears to support the police. power-damnum tJlJsquc
injuritJ doctrine enunciated in Archer v. City of Los Angeles
(1941), 19 Cal.2d 19 [119 P.2d 11, and in O'HtJrtJ v. LOll
AngeZe, County Flood Control Did. (1941), 19 Cal.2d 61
[119 P.2d 23]. 1 would prefer, with Mr. Justice Carter, to
overrule the holdings of the Archer and 0 'Hara eases in
respect to the mentioned doctrine.
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied August
31,1950•
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